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College admissions committees, not markets, ration access to many of the
most selective U.S. colleges. As the labor market payoff to a college education
has risen and competition for admission to elite universities has become more
keen, racial preference in college admissions has become increasingly
controversial, particularly at public institutions. In the spring of 1996 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals dramatically narrowed the latitude to use race in
determining admissions to colleges within its jurisdiction, and the Supreme
Court subsequently refused to review this decision. The following fall, voters in
California approved a proposal to end the use of racial and ethnic preferences in
admissions to state institutions. A number of other states are also reconsidering
the role of race and ethnicity in admissions and financial aid. Some will wait for
the Supreme Court to clarify the legal issues at stake, but some may not.1
Because colleges shroud their admissions procedures in mystery, the public
knows little about the extent to which racial preference is practiced. Even less is
known about the impact of such preferences on the later careers of black and
white youth. This Article explores these questions using data collected from the
high school class of 1982.
Part I uses the High School and Beyond (HSB) survey to analyze the
importance of race to college admission decisions in the early 1980s. It shows
that racial preference is confined to "elite" colleges and universities, namely,
the most academically selective fifth of all four-year institutions, where scores
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on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) averaged 1,100 or more.2 The proportion
of minority students at these colleges would be extremely low if admissions
committees ignored the race or ethnicity of applicants. In fact, African-
American applicants enjoy an advantage equivalent to an increase of two-thirds
of a point in high school grade point average (GPA)-on a four-point scale-or
400 points on the SAT. However, at the less exclusive four-year colleges that
80 percent of students attend, we could not respect the hypothesis that race
plays almost no role in admission decisions.
Part II examines the costs and benefits for minority students and students
with low SAT scores of attending an elite college. The most damning charge
against racial preference policies is that they harm their intended beneficiaries
by enticing unqualified students to colleges where they cannot do the work. The
HSB data do not support this claim. For the class of 1982, attending a more
selective college is associated with higher graduation rates and higher earnings
for both minority and nonminority students. Since one cannot control all the
initial differences between students admitted to different kinds of colleges, one
cannot be sure that the higher graduation rates and higher pay of those attending
more selective institutions are pure "value added." What looks like an effect of
attending an elite college may really be an effect of unmeasured preexisting
differences in academic or earning potential. However, there is no evidence that
the benefits associated with attending an elite school are any lower for black and
Hispanic students than for white non-Hispanic students.
Finally, Part EII explores what would happen if colleges used class-based
preferences instead of race-based preferences. Unless elite colleges dramatically
reduce their reliance on high school grades and standardized test scores, class-
based preferences cannot do much to cushion the impact of the elimination of
race-based preferences. Although blacks and Hispanics would benefit
disproportionately from policies favoring low-income applicants, minorities
constitute only a small fraction of all high-scoring disadvantaged youth. As a
result, substituting class-based for race-based preferences would not suffice to
maintain racial diversity at academically selective colleges. Most academically
selective colleges probably cannot have both race-blind admissions and racial
diversity on campus.
2 Note that since 1995, the SAT has been known as the Scholastic Assessment Test; see
Christopher Jencks, Racial Bias in Testing, in THm BLACK-WHrTE TEST SCORE GAP 55
(Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998).
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I. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER
EDUCATION
Black and white parents have on average different amounts of education and
income, and their children often attend different high schools. On the average,
black and white college applicants also have different high school grades and
scores on standardized tests. Without direct knowledge of the weight that
admissions committees attach to each of these characteristics, it is a difficult to
know how important race, per se, is to committee decisions.
Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray use differences in the average SAT
scores of black and white students as evidence that elite colleges favor black
applicants. Table 12-1 shows that these differences were quite large, ranging
from 288 points at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1988 to 95 points
at Harvard in the early 1990s. On the basis of these data, Hernstein and
Murray conclude that "the edge given to minority applicants to college and
graduate school is not a nod in their favor in the case of a close call, but an
extremely large advantage that puts black and Latino candidates in a separate
admissions competition. " 3
But table 12-1 might well be misleading for two reasons. 4 First, it is known
there are large differences between the mean SAT scores in the population of
black and white high school graduates. It is also known that factors other than
SAT scores, such as high school grades, personal references, and sometimes
even luck, can affect admission decisions. This means that even if admissions
committees were color blind, any racial differences in the mean SAT scores of
applicants would persist in attenuated form among those admitted. To see why,
suppose that a college admitted students either if they had an SAT score above
1,100 or if their last name began with a vowel. Such a process is race blind. But
the differences in SAT scores in the population at large will tend to be reflected
among the students admitted because those admitted on the basis of their last
names will have test scores similar to the scores of the population as a whole
(assuming that SAT scores are only weakly related to whether the last name
begins with a vowel).
Second, even if students were admitted solely on the basis of SAT score,
one would expect some racial difference in their mean scores, because the
distribution of SAT scores above the admission threshold would be different for
blacks and whites. The College Entrance Examination Board reports that blacks
in the high school class of 1982 represented 2 percent of those scoring over 500
on the mathematics SAT, 1 percent of those scoring over 600, and 0.6 percent
3 Herrustein and Murray (1994, p. 447).
4 For a more detailed discussion, see Dickens, Kane, and Schultze (1998).
1998]
974 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:971
of those scoring over 700.5 Blacks are thus increasingly underrepresented at
higher levels of performance. It follows that if a college admitted all students
who scored above 500, blacks would be disproportionately likely to have scores
in the 500 to 600 range, while whites would be overrepresented at higher levels.
As a result, even a color-blind college that admitted only students with
mathematics scores above 500 would find that on average its black students
scored lower than its white students.
Table 12-1. Racial and Ethnic Differences in SAT Scores, SelectedFour-Year Colleges,
1998 and Early 1990s
Test score points
Difference relative to whites
Institution Blacks Asians
Rice -271 70
University of California, Berkeley -288 2
University of Virginia -246 -22
Dartmouth -218 49
Oberlin -206 -57
University of Rochester -219 -37
Wesleyan -219 27
University of Chicago -207 -28
Stanford -171 58
Columbia -182 42
Duke -184 38
Williams -181 36
Northwestern -180 35
Wellesley -175 34
Swarthmore -200 -6
Amherst -178 18
Princeton -150 40
Brown -150 40
Cornell -162 21
University of Pennsylvania -150 23
Harvard -95 65
Georgetown -147 3
Massachusetts Institute of Technology -122 -5
Source: Hernistein and Murray (1994, p. 452). Data for the University of Virginia and the University of
California, Berkeley, are for 1988; others are from early 1990s.
Using data from the high school class of 1982, I estimate that if a college
relied entirely on high school GPA to rank students and admitted only those in
5 Ramist and Arbeiter (1984).
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the top third of their class, its white freshmen would score 180 points higher on
combined verbal and mathematics SAT scores than its black freshmen. 6 Even if
the college based admissions solely on SAT scores and admitted the top third of
high school students, whites would have mean SAT scores 34 points higher than
blacks. Therefore, an elite college could satisfy Hermstein and Murray's
standard only by discriminating against blacks and Hispanics because race-blind
rules would continue to produce differences in SAT scores by race. 7
To learn about the actual effect of affirmative action in college admissions,
one must look at which applicants specific colleges admit and reject. To answer
this question, I use data from the High School and Beyond survey, a
longitudinal survey of the high school class of 1982. The base year sample was
drawn from 1,015 public and private high schools in the United States. Students
were first surveyed in 1980, when they were in tenth grade, and followed up in
1982, 1984, 1986, and 1992. For students who attended a four-year college, I
add data on that college's undergraduate enrollment, the mean SAT score of its
entering freshmen, whether the college was historically black, and the percent
of the student body that was black and Hispanic.8
6 To simulate college admission decisions based on high school GPA alone, I sort
students by grade point average in academic subjects at high school, and for the top third,
calculate mean SAT scores by race and ethnicity. To simulate admissions based solely on
SAT scores, I follow the same procedure, after initially sorting students by SAT score.
7 Although this Article is concerned with inferring racial preference in college
admissions, the same problems arise when trying to infer discrimination in hiring, for
example. In that context the relevant question is: "Among those with a given level of
academic preparation, did blacks and whites end up at different levels?" Observers without
access to a representative sample of the population may tend to base their inferences on the
sample at hand-on the job, in their school, in their neighborhood-asking whether blacks
and whites have different mean qualifications. Surveys suggest that whites think there is
strong affirmative action in the labor market. Yet, William Johnson and Derek Neal show
that black males have lower annual earnings than similarly qualified whites. See William R.
Johnson & Derek Neal, Basic Sills and the Black-White Earnings Gap, in TE BLAcK-
WHrm TEST ScoRE GAP, supra note 2, at 480. The popular impression may rest on the same
mistaken reasoning as Hermstein and Murray's argument. For a discussion of the problems
of inferring discrimination by studying differences in qualifications among those with similar
earnings, see Goldberger (1984).
8 Mean SAT scores for colleges and universities were obtained from the Higher
Education Research Institute (HERJ) of the University of California, Los Angeles. HERI
gathers these data from college guides, such as Peterson's and Barron's. The SAT scores
published in such guides are reported by the schools and are not verified. The data manager
for the Peterson's guide reports sending out yearly mailings to 1,950 four-year schools.
Schools are asked to indicate what percentage of their admitted students fall within one-
hundred-point ranges on the mathematics and verbal sections of the SAT. The means in this
Article are calculated using weighted averages of the mid-points of these ranges. Each
school's form also carries that school's responses from the previous year. The school has the
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The 1984 followup asked respondents to list their top two choices among
the colleges to which they had applied, and to say whether they had been
accepted by them.9 The HSB survey includes students' scores on tests
administered during their sophomore and senior years in high school, high
school grades and activities, family income, and parental education.' 0 Holding
these characteristics constant, I estimate the effect of race and ethnicity on the
likelihood of being admitted to various types of colleges.
Table 12-2 shows the difference in the probability of acceptance associated
with different characteristics. The first column shows the effect on the predicted
acceptance rate of a one unit change in each characteristic when the applicant's
other characteristics were at the mean of the applicant pool. Overall, it shows
that blacks and Hispanics were 2.1 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively, more
likely to be admitted at the schools to which they applied than non-Hispanic
whites (hereafter, "whites") with similar credentials. 11 This advantage is
roughly as large as the advantage associated with being a member of student
government, having a B+ rather than a B average in high school, or scoring
1,130 rather than 1,000 on the SAT.
option to indicate that the data are unchanged; approximately 50 percent do so each year.
9 HSB respondents report higher acceptance rates than do colleges. Nine-tenths (89
percent) of the HSB sample who applied to a four-year college reported that they were
accepted; the College Entrance Examination Board (1994), by contrast, reports acceptance
rates of 70 percent at public institutions and 60 percent at private institutions. There are at
least three possible explanations for the divergence. First, only 39 percent of public colleges
and 49 percent of private institutions responded to the College Board survey. If more
selective institutions were more likely to respond, the estimated acceptance rate would be
biased upward. Second, colleges are probably more likely than students to report an
incomplete application as a denial. Colleges have an incentive to overstate selectivity, while
students may be reluctant to admit being denied admission. Indeed, there is some evidence in
the HSB data that colleges overstate average SAT scores of their students. Third, students
were only asked to name their first two choices. A disproportionate share of students may
have chosen not to list the most selective schools among the top two, to shield themselves
from having to admit that they were not accepted.
10 For the sample of students without SAT scores on their high school transcripts, I
imputed SAT scores by first regressing SAT scores on sophomore and senior HSB test scores
for those with SAT scores and then using the regression coefficients on sophomore and senior
test scores to impute SATs for those without them.
11 Students of primarily Asian ethnicity seem to be 4.5 percentage points less likely than
whites to be admitted.
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Table 12-2. Determinants of Admission to Four-Year Collegea
Vaioable
Racec
Racee
Black, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Other, non-Hispanic
Academic credentials
High school acade-
mic GPAd
SAT scoree
High school activities
Student government
Athletics
College selectivity
Mean college SAT f
Summary statistic
Sample size
Probability of admission
for average applicant
Quintile of college selectivityb
All colleges Lowest Second Third Fourth Top
0.021 -0.001 -0.014 -0.020 0.031 0.103
(0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.027) (0.011) (0.028)
0.022 0.010 0.000 -0.021 0.032 0.086
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.028) (0.013) (0.031)
-0.045 ... -0.053 -0.046 -0.087 -0.067
(0.018) (0.037) (0.043) (0.059) (0.040)
0.072 0.025 0.020 0.048 0.082 0.151
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (0.023)
0.016 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.020 0.025
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009)
0.019 0.002 0.026 0.009 0.002 0.053
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.020)
0.011 0.016 0.002 0.016 0.004 0.006
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.020)
-0.077 -0.026 -0.035 -0.078 -0.025 -0.165
(0.005) (0.013) (0.026) (0.079) (0.039) (0.018)
5,888 928 991 1,070 1,097 1,696
0.927 0.978 0.967 0.938 0.957 0.812
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the High School and Beyond survey.
a. Calculated from a probit regression analysis. The effect of being "other, non-Hispanic" is not identified for
the lowest quintile, since no such students were denied admission at those schools. Equations include indicators
for eight categories of fiamily income, five categories of parental education, and eight categories of high school
sample stratum. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are calculated using a method proposed by Huber (1967)
and White (1980), which allows the errors to be correlated among those applying to the same college.
b. Quintile breaks are set in such a way that equal numbers of students enrolled in each quintile.
c. Relative to non-Hispanic whites.
d. Scale is 0(F) to 4 (A).
e. Scale is 4 (400) to 16 (1600).
f. Scale is 4 (400) to 16 (1600).
However, the other five columns show that the admissions process differs
substantially at different types of school. To measure selectivity, I rank colleges
by their students' mean SAT scores and then divide them into five groups of
equal size. 12 At the least selective 60 percent of colleges, being black or
12 The quintile breaks are set so as to ensure that an equal number of students enrolled
in each quintile. Note that the more selective colleges receive a disproportionate share of
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Hispanic had little effect on an applicant's chances of admission. This is mainly
because these colleges admitted almost all of those who applied. Insofar as these
colleges were selective, they seem to have relied largely on high school grades
and SAT scores. A high school grade point average of B rather than C raised an
applicant's chances of admission to a college in the middle quintile by 5 percent,
for example, whereas being black or Hispanic had no statistically identifiable
effect.
Racial and ethnic differences in the probability of admission are most
pronounced at the most selective colleges. At these colleges, otherwise average
applicants were 8 to 10 percent more likely to be admitted if they were black or
Hispanic. Such a differential is comparable to the effect of having an A- rather
than a B average in high school or a total SAT score of 1,400 rather than
1,00.13
Table 12-3 investigates whether race affects the weight that elite colleges
put on an applicant's other characteristics. Colleges seem to put less weight on
high school GPA when evaluating minority applicants. Other characteristics,
including SAT scores, evidently have about the same impact on black and white
students' chances of admission.
Tables 12-2 and 12-3 describe racial and ethnic differences in the
likelihood of admission, after controlling for the student characteristics
reported in the HSB survey. Elite colleges also ask applicants to provide
other types of information, such as letters of recommendation, that are not
measured by the HSB survey. If blacks look better than whites on these
"unobservables," table 12-2 overstates the extent of racial preference in
college admissions. If minority applicants look worse than white applicants
on these unobservables, the table understates the degree of racial
preference.
applicants. The results in table 12-2 assume that within each quintile, the cutoffs used by
more selective schools are a linear function of the college's mean SAT score. Appendix table
12A-1 reports similar results when college fixed effects are included.
13 The High School and Beyond survey retrieved SAT scores from high school records,
when such scores were available. For the remaining cases, I estimate SAT scores from the
HSB test battery, using an ordinary least squares equation estimated for students who had
both SAT and HSB scores.
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Table 12-3. Racial Preference in Admissions and Characteristics of Students and
Colleges, Four-Year Colleges in Top Quintile of Selectivitya
Diference in predictedprobability,
evaluated at sample mean
Variable (1) (2) (3)b (4)c
Black, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Minority*own SAT score
Minority*high school GPA
Minority*high school
student government
Minority*high school
athletics
Minority*low income
Minority*private college
Black, non-Hispanic
southern stated
Black, non-Hispanic
Hispanic state
e
Hispanic, southern
stated
Hispanic, Hispanic
state
e
0.145 0.115 0.073 0.101
(0.085) (0.028) (0.038) (0.028)
0.139
(0.090)
0.012
(0.018)
-0.081
(0.039)
0.040
(0.047)
0.052
(0.042)
0.096
(0.030)
0.055
(0.043)
0.121
(0.032)
-0.098 .
(0.074)
.. . 0.064 ..
(0.041)
... 0.105
(0.061)
... -0.009
(0.155)
... -0.040
(0.098)
... -0.078
(0.080)
Source: Author's calculations based on data from sources for table 12-2.
a. Calculated from a probit regression analysis. Equations include indicators for participation in high school
athletics, high school student government, and other high school activities; the student's own SAT score; the
college's mean SAT score; the student's high school GPA in academic subjects; eight categories of family
income; five categories of parental education; and eight categories of high school sample stratum. The
specification in column 4 also includes an indicator for Hispanic states and southern states. Standard errors,
shown in parentheses, are calculated using the method proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980); see table
12-2, note a.
b. Includes an indicator for private colleges.
c. Includes indicators for colleges in "southern" and "Hispanic" states; see notes d and e below.
d. Southern states include Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama.
e. Hispanic states include California, New Mexico, Arizona.
One way to examine whether the limited range of data available from the
HSB questionnaire biases my estimates of racial preference is to focus on
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students who applied to more than one college and compare their chances of
admission at more and less selective institutions. This comparison effectively
controls both observed and unobserved characteristics of students. One can then
ask whether the chance of admission falls more for whites than for blacks as the
selectivity of the colleges to which they apply increases. Table 12-4 shows that
applying to a college with a mean SAT score 100 points higher reduces the
average applicant's probability of admission by 28 percent. 14 For black and
Hispanic applicants, this trade-off seems to be somewhat less pronounced: a 100
point increase in a college's mean SAT score reduces the probability of
admission by only 21.6 percent (0.281 - 0.065). Although this black-white
difference is on the margin of statistical significance, it is consistent with the
earlier and more statistically robust finding that elite colleges put more weight
on race in their admissions decisions. 15
Table 12-4. Racial Difference in the Probability of Being Admitted to a More Selective
Four-Year Collegea
Effect on probability of adnission Change in probability
(admitted to first choice - admitted to second choice) of admission
100 point difference in colleges' mean SAT -0.281
(mean SAT of 1st choice - mean SAT of 2nd choice)/100 (0.065)
100 point difference in colleges' SAT*Black, Hispanic 0.065
(0.049)
Source: Author's calculations based on data from sources for table 12-2.
a. Calculated from a probit regression analysis. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample is limited to
students who applied to two four-year colleges and were accepted at only one. Sample size is 467.
II. THE BENEFITS OF ATTENDING A SELECTIVE COLLEGE
One of the more provocative charges leveled against racial preference in
college admissions is that the policy actually hurts the intended beneficiaries, by
enticing minority youth to enter colleges for which they are underprepared and
in which they are more likely to fail because of the competition from other
students. Indeed, some have claimed that reverse discrimination explains the
high dropout rates and low grade point averages of minority undergraduates.
This section examines the payoff to attending a selective college for both
minority and nonminority students.
14 The probit specification used to generate table 12-4 can be estimated only for the
sample of students who applied to two four-year colleges and were accepted at one, but not
both.
15 Because the sample is limited to those who applied to two colleges and were accepted
at only one of these, the racial differential in likelihood of admission at higher quality schools
has a large standard error, with a two-sidedp value of 0.19.
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A student's college performance is likely to depend on at least three distinct
factors: prior educational preparation (as measured by a standardized test
score), the quality of the college (proxied by the mean standardized test score of
the other students attending that college), and the match between the student's
preparation and the preparation of other students at the same college (as
measured by the difference between the student's standardized test score and the
mean score of other students at the college). Observers are not always careful to
distinguish these effects. For instance, in an article in the Public Interest, John
Bunzel catalogued the poor grades and high dropout rates of black students
admitted under an affirmative action program at the University of California,
Berkeley. 16 His discussion implies that these high dropout rates were the result
of the difference between the SAT scores of black students and those of most
other students at Berkeley.17 But given their lower test scores and high school
grades, it is perfectly possible that these black students would have dropped out
in large numbers no matter which college they attended. In order to learn about
the net effect of attending a more selective school, one must compare graduation
rates for academically similar students at different schools.
Table 12-5 shows the determinants of the college grade point averages of
students in the HSB survey. In all of the estimates reported, students' high
school records and family backgrounds are held constant. 18 Column 1 shows
that without adjustment for SAT scores or high school grades, the college GPAs
of black and Hispanic students are roughly 0.3 points lower than those of white
and Asian students-equivalent to a B rather than B+ average, for example.
This is consistent with the evidence presented by Bunzel. Column 2 estimates
the college GPA gap between blacks and whites with the same SAT score, high
school GPA, family income, and parental education. I find, as do many other
authors, that blacks and Hispanics have lower college GPAs than whites with
apparently similar academic credentials and family background. 19 This suggests
16 Bunzel (1988).
17 Herrnstein and Murray (1994) draw a similar conclusion.
18 The sample is limited to those who reported attending a four-year college. The GPA
results are based on grades from the first four-year college attended. For the B.A. completion
and earnings results, I analyze the characteristics of the first four-year college attended. To
limit the influence of outliers, I exclude those with annual earnings of less than $1,000 or
more than $100,000 from the earnings equation.
19 See Cleary (1968); Crouse and Trusheim (1988); Nettles, Theony, and Gosman
(1968); Ramist, Lewis, and McCamley-Jenkins (1994); Frederick E. Vars & William G.
Bowen, Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores, Race, and Academic Perfonmance in Selective
Colleges and Universities, in TIm BLACK-WHrrE TESr ScoR GAP, supra note 2, at 457.
Vars and Bowen report that the black-white gap in college GPAs is widest among students
with the highest SAT scores. When I test for evidence of a racial difference in the relationship
between SAT scores and college GPA, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the relationship is
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that Bunzel would have found that black and Hispanic students
"underperformed" relative to whites even if Berkeley had exercised a race blind
admissions policy in the 1980s.
The third column of table 12-5 shows that when one holds applicants'
characteristics constant, those who attended more selective colleges earned
lower grades-but the effect of selectivity is rather small. All else equal, a 100
point increase in a college's mean SAT score is associated with a 0.027 point
drop in a student's GPA. Since the mean SAT is only 200 points higher in the
top quintile of colleges than in the bottom quintile, attending a more selective
college has a small effect on a student's GPA.
Table 12-6 performs an equivalent exercise to show the effect of
college selectivity on college graduation rates, rather than grades.
Attending a more selective college is associated with a 3 percent increase in
the likelihood of graduating. In other words, the net effect of attending a
more selective institution on completion rates for students with similar test
scores is positive, not negative. Since studying at a selective college surely
puts students at some competitive disadvantage relative to their classmates,
this finding suggests that such colleges have offsetting advantages. Perhaps
better prepared classmates or better teachers make attending these colleges
more interesting. Selective colleges may also establish social norms that
favor staying in school.
Table 12-7 shows that holding an entering student's measured
characteristics constant, a 100 point increase in a college's mean SAT score is
associated with a 0.056 increase in the log of earnings in 1991, nine years after
high school graduation. That is equivalent to a 5.8 percent increase in actual
earnings.20 There is also some evidence that this payoff may have risen over
time.21
the same for blacks and whites. I suspect that my results differ from Vars and Bowen's
because our data come from different samples. In contrast to their sample of students from
highly selective colleges, the HSB data probably do not have enough power to distinguish
among students at the very top of the SAT distribution.
20 Since completion of the B.A. is not included in the earnings equation, the estimated
relationship between college selectivity and earnings includes the net effect of college quality
on degree completion.
21 Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg (1996). The finding that college selectivity is related to
earnings is also consistent with Daniel, Black, and Smith (1995), James and others (1989),
and Wales (1973).
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From their analysis of data on the high school class of 1972, Linda Loury
and David Garman conclude that greater college selectivity is associated with
higher graduation rates for whites, but lower rates for blacks.22 In table 12-6,
column 4 shows, consistent with Loury and Garman, that the relationship
between college selectivity and completion of the B.A. is significantly weaker
for minority youth than for whites and Asians, although it is not negative.
Column 5 shows why this is the case. College selectivity has less impact on
blacks in this context because many black undergraduates attend historically
black institutions, which have low mean SAT scores but high graduation rates.
These institutions have traditionally generated a disproportionate share of black
college graduates in the United States. For the 1980s, the HSB shows that
blacks who attended historically black institutions still had completion rates 17.2
percent higher than apparently similar minority students in historically white
schools. After taking this fact into account, one finds that among students in
historically white institutions, selectivity has about the same effect on the
graduation rates of minority and nonminority students. Table 12-7 shows that
college selectivity is positively associated with earnings and that the payoff is
similar for blacks and whites. However, although attending an HBI was
positively related to B.A. completion, there is no statistically significant
relationship with earnings. 23
22 Loury and Garman (1995).
23 For insightful discussions of the economic importance of historically black institutions
in the careers of their graduates, see Constantine (1995); Ehrenberg and Rothstein (1994).
The statistically insignificant earnings differential associated with attending a historically black
institution is consistent with the finding reported by Ehrenberg and Rothstein (1994), who use
the same survey as Loury and Garman (1995). Constantine (1995) also finds a small earnings
differential for attending a historically black institution using ordinary least squares, but she
reports a positive and significant earnings payoff to attending such an institution when she
attempts to control for differences in students' unobserved characteristics. This points to
another important difference between these results and those of Loury and Garman: Loury
and Garman's estimation strategy implicitly assumes that B.A. completion has the same
impact on earnings regardless of the college attended. Since they find a weaker relationship
between college selectivity and completion rates for black and Hispanic youth, they
necessarily find a weaker relationship between college selectivity and earnings for minority
youth. However, because the earnings results reported in table 12-7 are not conditional on
degree completion, the coefficient of the mean SAT score implicitly includes any effects of
college quality that operate through completion rates. If Loury and Garman had estimated
only the gross relationship between college selectivity and earnings for blacks and whites,
they might well have found it the same for blacks and Hispanics as for others-even without
considering the effects of attending a historically black institution.
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In tables 12-5, 12-6, and 12-7, column 6 controls for all differences
between colleges, using a fixed effects model. Column 6 therefore estimates the
impact of different influences on students who attend the same institution. Using
this approach, the relationship between college selectivity, college GPA,
completion of the B.A., and earnings never varies significantly by race. Column
7 tests for an interaction between the student's own test score and the mean
score at the college that the student attended. The interaction is significantly
negative for both graduation rates and earnings. This would suggest that the
gains associated with attending a more selective school are higher for those with
lower test scores.24
As noted above, selective colleges ask applicants for more information than
does the HSB survey. This additional information substantially improves the
ability of elite colleges to predict college grades.25 Since most selective colleges
also use this information to select students, one must assume that the students
that they admit differ from those at other colleges in ways that the HSB does not
measure. That makes it difficult to infer the true value added by more selective
institutions. All one can say is that the estimates in tables 12-6 and 12-7
probably overstate the benefits of attending a more selective college. But there
is no reason to think that this bias is larger for minority students than for other
students-in fact, one might expect the bias to be smaller for minority students,
since it is primarily the most selective schools that use racial preferences in
admissions decisions. In terms of both B.A. completion and earnings, the racial
difference in the payoff to attending a more selective college is small and
insignificant. To the extent that more selective institutions offer benefits to their
students, these payoffs seem to be as large for black and Hispanic youth as for
white youth.
HI. CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
As political support for the use of racial and ethnic preferences in college
admissions has eroded, some have argued that colleges should replace racial
preferences with a system of class-based preferences. 26 Indeed Michael
Williams, who opposed race-based scholarships as an official in George Bush's
administration, recently suggested that "the end of racial preferences is here,
but... with some ingenuity and creativity, America's campuses can continue
24 None of the results in tables 12-5 to 12-7 are sensitive to the linear specifications
used. I obtain similar results by using a wide range of polynomials for a student's own SAT,
the college's mean SAT, and the difference between the two.
25 See Vars & Bowen, supra note 19.
26 For a summary of the case for class-based preferences, see Kahlenberg (1996).
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to represent the wide variety that is America." 27
As table 12-8 shows, class is a very poor substitute for race for selective
colleges seeking racial diversity. The problem is simply one of demographics.
To illustrate the point, I tabulate a representative sample of youth from the high
school class of 1992. The top panel of table 12-8 presents the cross-tabulation of
race by family income for the full sample of those graduating in 1992; the
bottom panel presents a similar cross-tabulation for the subsample of youth with
combined math and reading test scores in the top 10 percent of the class. (Row
proportions are reported in parentheses and column proportions are reported in
square brackets.)
As reported in the top panel of table 12-8, blacks and Hispanics were
roughly three times as likely as white and other non-Hispanic students to come
from families with incomes at or below $20,000 (51.2 percent of blacks and
Hispanics as opposed to 17.5 percent of whites and others). Such facts are the
source of the intuition that income-based preference in college admissions would
disproportionately benefit black and Hispanic youth since they are more likely
to be from low-income backgrounds than whites and other non-Hispanics.
However, as reported in the row percentages in the top panel of table 12-8, less
than half (47 percent) of those who were low-income were black or Hispanic.
The simple reason for the paradox is that blacks and Hispanics are a minority of
the population and, as a result, are a minority of most subgroups of the
population, including low-income youth.
However, as reported in the bottom panel of table 12-8, this paradox is
even more telling among the youth with test scores in the top 10 percent of the
class of 1992. Again, black and Hispanic youth are three times as likely to be
low-income: 17.2 percent of blacks and Hispanics and 6.1 percent of white and
other non-Hispanic students with high scores came from families with incomes
at or below $20,000. However, among the high-scoring youth who were also
low-income, only 17.3 percent (roughly one out of six) were black or Hispanic.
27 Michael L. Williams, "Racial Diversity without Racial Preferences," Chronicle of
Higher Education, November 15, 1996, p. A64.
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Table 12-8. The Demographics of Race and Income, High School Class of 1992
Among Those Graduating from High School in 1992
(Row proportion)
[Column proportion]
Blacks and Whites and other
Hispanics non-Hispanics Row total
Income > $20,000 266,700 1,493,100 1,759,800
(0.152) (0.848) (1.000)
[0.487] [0.825] [0.747]
Income < $20,000 280,100 316,200 596,300
(0.470) (0.530) (1.000)
[0.512] [0.175] [0.253]
Column total 546,800 1,809,300 2,356,100
(0.232) (0.768)
[1.000] [1.000]
Among Those Graduating from High School in 1992
Who Had Combined Reading and Math Test Scores in the Top Tenth of the Class
(Row proportion)
[Column proportion]
Blacks and Whites and other
Hispanics non-Hispanics Row total
Income > $20,000 11,800 182,000 193,800
(0.061) (0.939) (1.000)
[0.828] [0.939] [0.932]
Income < $20,000 2,400 11,700 14,200
(0.173) (0.827) (1.000)
[0.172] [0.061] [0.068]
Column total 14,200 193,800 208,000
(0.068) (0.932)
[1.000] [1.000]
Source: Author's calculations based on National Education Longitudinal Study (NML.) data.
In other words, if a selective college with an application pool of students
with test scores in the top ten percent granted a preference to students with
family incomes below $20,000, only one out of six would be black or Hispanic.
The reason is not that high-scoring black or Hispanic youth have higher
incomes than white and other non-Hispanic youth. Clearly, they do not. As in
the full sample of high school graduates in 1992, black or Hispanic youth with
test scores in the top 10 percent were three times as likely to be low income
than white and other non-Hispanic youth. Rather, the source of the apparent
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paradox is that blacks and Hispanics are a minority of the population, and a
very small minority of students with test scores in the top ten percent (6.8
percent) and as a result, represent a minority of most subgroups of the
population, including low-income youth.
There may be other characteristics that are more highly correlated with race
than income alone, such as family wealth or neighborhood poverty rates, that a
college might use to construct a "race-blind" measure for promoting racial
diversity. However, since blacks and Hispanics are only 6.8 percent of the
highest-scoring youth, it would be difficult to find a preference that would yield
even a majority of black or Hispanic youth. For instance, even if high-scoring
black or Hispanic youth were thirteen times more likely to meet some
combination of wealth, neighborhood, and family income criteria than other
youth, they would still represent less than half of the high-scoring youth meeting
the criteria.28
Table 12-8 also illustrates another implication of the demographics of race,
income, and test scores. Although high-scoring black or Hispanic youth are
three times as likely to have incomes less than $20,000 than whites and other
non-Hispanic youth, only 17.2 percent of high-scoring black or Hispanic youth
come from such low-income families (as compared with 51.2 percent of all
black or Hispanic youth). Because test scores are so strongly related to family
income, a small share of the high-scoring minority youth-those most likely to
benefit from a race-based criterion at selective schools-are actually low-
income.
Highly selective colleges have four options. First, they can continue current
policies. That is, they can continue to admit students primarily on the basis of
test scores and high school grades, but boost black and Hispanic enrollments
with some form of racial preference near the academic margin.
Second, they can replace current racial preferences with much larger scale
class-based programs, at the same time becoming less academically selective.
28 This is a simple application of Bayes' Rule. For example, suppose that P(D IBH) and
P(D 10) are the proportions of black and Hispanic and other youth that meet some definition
of "disadvantaged" respectively. Suppose further that P(BH) is the proportion of the
population in question that is black or Hispanic. Bayes' Rule implies that the proportion of
disadvantaged youth that are black or Hispanic [P(BHID)] can be expressed as
P(BH)D = PtDIB)PBMH kPBR)
P(DIBH)P(B) +P(DIO)(1-P(BH)) kP(BH) = (I - P(B))
(where k is the relative likelihood that blacks and Hispanic youth meet the definition of
disadvantage, P(D IBH)/P(D 10)). Within a pool of youth that is only 6.8 percent black or
Hispanic [P(BH) =.068], it can be shown that P(BHID) is greater than 0.5 only if k is
greater than 13.7.
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This would mean deemphasizing high school grades and especially SAT scores,
which put minority students at a substantial disadvantage, and emphasizing
nonacademic selection standards that have less adverse impact on minority
applicants.
Third, they can remain as academically selective as at present, replace race-
based preferences with class-based preferences, and allow the number of black
and Hispanic youth on campus to drop sharply. And fourth, they can abandon
racial preferences and allow minority enrollment to drop even more than it
would if they adopted class-based preferences instead.
In short, there is an inescapable trade-off between race blindness and racial
diversity. Class-based preferences do not offer a way out of the quandary.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court decision in the
Bakke case affirmed the use of race as one factor in college admissions, many
of the most basic questions regarding the magnitude of racial preference in
college admissions have remained unanswered. In this Article, I have attempted
to provide some answers using data from the high school graduating class of
1982. The evidence suggests that use of race in college admissions appears to be
limited to the most selective 20 percent of four-year institutions. Yet at these
institutions, race weighs heavily in admission decisions: being black or Hispanic
has approximately the same effect on one's chances of admission as two-thirds'
of a grade point performance in high school or roughly 400 points on the SAT
test.
Two claims are often made in the debate over racial preferences that, if
true, would greatly simplify the impending decisions regarding the fate of racial
preference policies. The first is that racial preferences actually harm the
intended beneficiaries, leading to lower college completion rates by black and
Hispanic youth, putting them at a competitive disadvantage relative to their
classmates. If such a claim were true, all racial groups could be made better off
by ending affirmative action in college. However, the evidence suggests that the
matter is not so simple: even if a student's characteristics are held constant,
attendance at a more selective institution is associated with higher earnings and
higher college completion rates for minority students as well as white and other
non-Hispanic students. College retention rates are lower for black and Hispanic
students, apparently because of differences in academic preparation emerging
from high school and racial differences in performance among otherwise similar
students within most colleges. But to the extent that affirmative action leads
minority students to attend more selective colleges than they would otherwise,
affirmative action may actually lead to narrower rather than wider gaps in
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college retention rates by race, since the net relationship between college
selectivity, earnings, and college graduation rates appears to be positive for
minority and other students.
The second claim is that colleges could achieve the same extent of racial
diversity on campus without using race explicitly by granting preferences in
admissions on the basis of other factors such as family income or family wealth.
To the extent that society values both race blindness and racial diversity on elite
campuses, the prospect of a race-blind rule producing an equivalent degree of
racial diversity on campus is an attractive one, since it would seem to achieve
the goal of diversity at less cost in terms of an explicit racial preference.
However, the evidence suggests that a race-blind route to racial diversity is
likely to be hard to find. Because blacks and Hispanics represent such a small
share of students with standardized test scores in the top of their class, colleges
are likely to have a difficult time finding any subgroup of high-scoring students
in which blacks or Hispanics are anything but a small minority. For instance,
although high-scoring black or Hispanic youth are more likely to be from low-
income backgrounds, they represent only one out of six low-income students
with test scores in the top tenth of the class of 1992.
The debate over affirmative action in college admissions will depend on a
careful weighing of the value of racial diversity on college campuses against the
real costs imposed on the students who are not admitted. In social policy
debates, the easy answers-promising social benefits without social costs-
usually prove ephemeral. The debate over affirmative action in college
admissions is likely to be no different. Although one might make a case for
class-based preferences in their own right, they are unlikely to serve as an easy
substitute for race-based preferences in generating racial diversity. Likewise,
however large the gains in terms of equity or increased access to college for
white and other non-Hispanic youth, an end to racial preferences would seem to
impose real costs on minority youth. Thus there is no avoiding the difficult
trade-offs to be made.
However, the political debate over affirmative action in college admissions
is likely to be complicated by the fact that it is difficult for white and other non-
Hispanic youth to assess how racial preferences affect their own chances of
admission to elite colleges. Handicapped parking policy provides a useful
analogy. 29 Suppose that one parking space in front of a popular restaurant is
reserved for disabled drivers. Many of the nondisabled drivers who pass by the
space while circling the parking lot in search of a place to park may be tempted
to think that they would have an easier time finding a space if the space had not
been reserved. Although eliminating the space would have only a minuscule
29 1 am grateful to George Akerlof for suggesting this analogy.
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effect on the average parking search for nondisabled drivers, the cumulative
cost perceived by each passing driver is likely to exceed the true cost simply
because people have a difficult time thinking about small probability events.
In the same way, many families are likely to misperceive the impact of
racial preference in college admissions. Harvard College, for example, accepts
roughly 10 out of 100 applicants. Only 1.5 out of the 10 that are admitted (15
percent of students) are black or Hispanic. Even if ending racial preferences
excluded all black and Hispanic students (an upper-bound estimate, since many
minority applicants would be admitted using color-blind procedures), only 1.5
out of the 90 students who were denied admission would now find a space. Yet,
if more than 1.5 out of the 90 students who are now denied think they would be
the next person in line when racial preferences are ended, the perceived costs of
affirmative action are likely to exceed the actual costs.
Therefore, whatever the true costs of affirmative action in college
admissions, the perceived costs are likely to be overstated. The implications of
this insight could be used both by supporters and opponents of racial
preferences. On the one hand, whatever pedagogical benefits racial diversity
produces on campus are being compared with a perceived cost that is likely to
be exaggerated. To the extent this is true, the political process is likely to
underprovide diversity on campus. On the other hand, whatever benefit is being
generated by affirmative action in admissions, the resentment that is produced is
likely to be disproportionate. Even if the perceived costs are exaggerated, they
represent a real social cost. Therefore, the "handicapped parking" analogy
provides an apt description of the quandary college presidents, judges, and
voters now face as the future of affirmative action in college admissions is
debated.
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APPENDIX: DETERMINANTS OF ADMISSION TO A FOUR-YEAR COLLEGE
Table 12A-1 shows the probability of acceptance by a four-year college for
applicants with different characteristics, similar to table 12-2, but including
college fixed effects.
Table 12A-1. Determinants of Admission to Four-Year College, College FRxed Effects
Includeda
•Quintile of college selectivityb
Variable Lowest Second Third Fourth Top
Racec
Black, non-Hispanic 0.004 -0.009 -0.012 0.039 0.168
(0.013) (0.028) (0.045) (0.015) (0.022)
Hispanic -0.021 0.018 0.028 0.023 0.122
(0.028) (0.017) (0.035) (0.019) (0.031)
Other, non-Hispanic ... -0.100 0.008 -0.139 -0.022
(0.099) (0.055) (0.093) (0.044)
Academic credentials
High school academic GPAd 0.054 0.038 0.108 0.104 0.219
(0.027) (0.015) (0.025) (0.019) (0.026)
SAT scoree 0.010 0.029 0.016 0.027 0.049
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
High school activities
Student government 0.011 0.032 0.019 0.004 0.090
(0.006) (0.017) (0.027) (0.017) (0.024)
Athletics 0.029 0.006 0.007 -0.008 0.028
(0.019) (0.016) (0.026) (0.015) (0.027)
Summary statisic
Number of college effects estimated 25 37 49 42 105
Sample size 215 380 579 725 1,393
Source: Author's calculations based on data from sources for table 12-2.
a. The effect of being "other, non-Hispanic" is not identified for the lowest quintile, since no such students
were denied admission at those schools. Equations include eight categories of family income, five categories of
parental education, and eight categories of high school sample stratum. Standard errors, shown in parentheses,
are calculated using the method proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980); see table 12-2, note a.
b. Quintile breaks are set in such a way that equal numbers of students enrolled in each quintile.
c. Relative to non-Hispanic whites.
d. Scale is 0(F) to 4 (A).
e. Scale is 4 (400) to 16 (1600).
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